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TAXATION
Charles H. Randall, Jr.*
I. LEGISLATION
Although more than the usual number of interesting and chal-
lenging cases on the subject of taxation were presented to the
South Carolina Supreme Court in the period under review, legis-
lative developments deserve prior comment. The 1965 Report of
the Tax Study Commission to the General Assembly makes
three recommendations which deserve the careful attention of
every tax practitioner. None of these recommendations were
enacted during the 1965 session, but they are under study by com-
mittees of the general assembly.
The first proposal is to replace the present income tax,' with
a statute under which taxable income would be calculated with
reference to taxable income as defined in federal law, with appro-
priate adjustments to meet constitutional and other considera-
tions. The general assembly would enact the rates and exemp-
tions. The object is to simplify computation of taxes for taxpayer
and tax administrators alike. "The South Carolina Income Tax
return might then be reduced to a one-page flyer attached to a
copy of an already prepared Federal income tax return. 2 This
proposal is a bold and practical one. South Carolina's income
tax statutes have a deceptive appearance of simplicity, but be-
cause of the few annotations and clarifying regulations there-
under, many questions are left unanswered. Since the tax prac-
titioner must struggle with the federal materials anyway, the
net result of conforming the two acts would be economy of time
and effort for all. Many states have adopted such a system.3
A second proposal urges granting to the tax board of review
jurisdiction over appeals from the tax commission, with further
appeal permitted to the court of common pleas. It is proposed
that the board be reduced to three commissioners. The purpose
of the proposal to grant this additional jurisdiction to the board
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; Visiting Professor of
Law, Tulane University, 1965-1966.
1. S.C. CODE Aim. §§ 65-201 to -367 (1962).
2. 1965 SOUTH CAROLINA TAx ComM'N SXT H AN. REP. 13-14.
3. Id. at 15. The report states that Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
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is to provide a disinterested tribunal within the tax adminis-
trative system.4
The third proposal is that the general assembly enact a state
gift tax law based on the federal gift tax, together with an estate
tax credit.6 Since South Carolina has adopted an estate tax law
based on federal law,0 the proposed additional legislation has the
objective of protecting the estate tax.
In addition to these fundamental proposals for law revision,
the tax study commission continues to survey the detailed tax
law and to recommend technical amendments thereto to the gen-
eral assembly. The work of the commission has been sound in tax
philosophy and highly competent in execution. The commission
has served the citizens of the state well over the six years of its
existence, and its efforts deserve the informed support of the bar.
II. JuiciAL, DECISiONS
A. Taxing South Carolina Portion of Nationwide Business-
Apportionment Formulas.
In Hertz Corp. v. South Carolina Tax CommV'n the taxpayer
raised questions as to interpretation of provisions of the code
prescribing formulas for apportioning the tax attributable to
South Carolina activities, where a foreign corporation is engaged
in activities throughout the United States. Beginning in 1958,
South Carolina enacted a system of allocation of income, to
subject such businesses to tax on income "upon a base which rea-
sonably represents the proportion of the trade or business carried
on within this State."s The statutory scheme provides that a
taxpayer whose principal business in this state is (a) manufac-
turing, or analagous activities, or "(b) selling, distributing or
dealing in tangible personal property within this State "(em-
phasis added) 9 shall compute net income based on the arithmeti-
4. Id. at 17. The proposal recommends the addition of one appointee to the
present five member tax commission, and then designation of three of the six
as tax commissioners and three as the tax board of review. The former would
exercise administrative functions, the latter quasi-judicial functions.
5. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, §§ 2501-2524 contain the gift tax provisions, while
§ 2012 provides the gift tax credit on the federal estate tax law.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-451 to -570 (1962).
7. 246 S.C. 92, 142 S.E.2d 445 (1965).
8. This language is found in the preamble to the acts, and is not found in
the codification in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-279 to -279.11 (1962). S.C. AcTs &
3. REs. 1959, p. 363; S.C. AcTs & J. REs. 1958, p. 1574.
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cal average of three ratios, (1) property within the state com-
pared with property everywhere, (2) payrolls within the state
compared with payrolls everywhere, and (3) sales within the
state compared with sales everywhere.'0 Some specified items
of income are directly allocated to a particular state without
using this formula. The arithmetical average of the three ratios
is then multiplied by the remaining net income of the company.
Taxpayers other than those described use a ratio of gross receipts
in the state to gross receipts everywhere."
Taxpayer Hertz was engaged in the business of renting or
leasing motor vehicles throughout the United States, including
South Carolina. Hertz argued that in computing its income, it
was entitled to use the three ratio method.12 It argued that the
statute contained a definition of the word "sales" in describing
the sales ratio, and that it should follow that the same definition,
applicable by the particular section to the entire article in the
code, should be utilized to define "selling" in section 65-279.3.
The provision relating to the sales ratio contains the sentence,
"The word 'sales' as used in this article shall be construed to
include rentals of tangible personal property the rentals from
which are not separately allocated under this article.' 3 In the
words of Circuit Judge Grimball, adopting this argument, "While
the word 'sales' is used in Section 3 [Section 65-279.3], it would
be reasonable to assume that the Legislature, having equated
sales with rentals, meant that 'selling' be interpreted as [includ-
ing] 'renting.' "14
Hertz further argued that it was included within the phrase
"dealing in tangible personal property." The supreme court,
affirming Circuit Judge Grimball, held that Hertz' income
should be computed using the three ratio formula. Mr. Justice
Brailsford said for the court:
The nature of the taxpayer's business is entirely appropriate
to the use of the three factor formula .... The Tax Com-
mission's insistence that the words 'dealing in' are used in
sub-division (b) of the classification, quoted above, as sy-
10. Ibid.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-279.10 (1962).
12. It should be noted that the method is not elective but mandatory, if a tax-
payer falls within the classification in S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-279.3 (1962).
Sections 65-279.7 to -279.9 permit some elective flexibility.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-279.6 (1962).
14. Order of Circuit Judge Grimball, Record, pp. 12, 14, Hertz Corp. v.
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nonymous with selling and distributing is unnecessarily
restrictive and is inconsistent with the legislative intention
to obtain a broad coverage of businesses to which the three
ratio formula is appropriate. 5
This appears to be a wise resolution of the statutory problem.
Although the Hertz activities are not technically "selling" activi-
ties, there appears no reason why the legislative scheme to allo-
cate income fairly to business activities in the several states
should not embrace this case, and no distortion of the statutory
language is required to reach this result.
B. Net Operating Loss Carry-over; "New Business."
The state's income tax allows a taxpayer, who has established
a new business or industry in the state, to utilize a net operating
loss carry-over for the first three years of the operation of the
new business or industry.'0 This provision was held in 1963
by the attorney general to be inapplicable to the continuation of
an old, established business by a new owner.17 In Chronicle Pub-
ishers, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n'8 the problem came
to the supreme court. Chronicle Publishers was chartered on
March 1, 1956, and on March 3 it purchased all the assets of a
corporation kmown as The Camden Chronicle, Inc. (Camden
Chronicle). Camden Chronicle had been in the business of pub-
lishing a newspaper in the city of Camden, and in a printing
business. Chronicle Publishers converted the newspaper after
purchase from a bi-weekly to a tri-weeldy publication, installed
new equipment worth some 50,000 dollars and enlarged the print-
ing business. There was no identity of officers or equity interest
between the two, and in fact, the key personnel of Camden
Chronicle left the company and established a rival paper, the
Camden News. It is obvious that there were now two newspapers
where formerly there was one, so that a "new business" had come
to Camden. Chronicle Publishers had net operating losses, which
it asserted could be carried over to later years under section
65-259(12). Reversing the trial court, the supreme court, in an
opinion by ir. Justice Brailsford, held that the statutory test
15. Hertz Corp. v. South Carolina Tax Conm'n, supra note 14.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-259(12) (1962).
17. Op. Ar'Y GEN. (1963). The brief for the attorney general appropriately
omits citing this opinion, which is dated after payment of the tax under protest
but before the filing of the complaint.
18. 244 S.C. 192, 136 S.E.2d 261 (1964).
4
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was not met, and hence the net operating loss-carry-over was not
available to Chronicle Publishers. The taxpayer had merely
acquired and improved an existing business. The "business or
industry" must be "new" to the state; the statute is not met
simply because the business is new to the taxpayer.19 The deci-
sion appears clearly correct in its finding that Chronicle Pub-
lishers was a continuation of the old business, and that a mere
change of ownership is insufficient to meet the statutory pro-
vision.
C. Tax Procedure-Necessity of Payment Under Protest.
In an age when federal income taxes loom so large in the total
tax picture, and federal estate and gift taxes are of significant
impact, tax counsel are apt to overlook principles that formerly
were considered basic. One such principle is the rule that a tax-
payer cannot sue a sovereign to recover a tax paid by him unless
he paid the tax under protest. Federal law has removed this pre-
requisite for the income, estate and gift, and excess profit taxes.
In other areas of taxation, including state taxation, tax counsel
should consider whether pertinent law requires payment under
protest as a condition for an action for refund. The basic provi-
sion permitting action to recover taxes wrongfully collected
under South Carolina law20 requires payment under protest and
suit within thirty days against the appropriate defendant, the
tax commission, the county treasurer, or the municipality.
City of CoZumbia v. Glens FaZs Ins. Co.21 involved the ques-
tion of whether a statutory exception to this basic law applied to
the particular facts. Glens Falls (and the South-Carolina Insur-
ance Company, whose action was consolidated with the Glens
Falls case) paid business license taxes to the city of Columbia for
the years 1959, 1960 and 1961. For the year 1962, Glens Falls
paid its business license tax under protest, asserting that the
payment was in excess of the legally collectible amount. This
position was sustained by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
22
On December 13, 1962 Glens Falls filed its petition with the
19. The court found highly persuasive authority in the analogous situation
of tax exemption for new manufacturing enterprises. Arkwright Mills v.
Murph, 219 S.C. 438, 65 S.E2d 665 (1951) ; cI. Duke Power Co. v. Bell, 156
S.C. 299, 152 S.E. 865 (1930).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2661 to -2667 (1962).
21. 245 S.C. 119, 139 S.E.2d 529 (1964).
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South Carolina Tax Commission, asserting that the city likewise
had exacted license fees for the three prior years in excess of the
statutory maximum. Jurisdiction was based on special statutory
exceptions to the general rule.23 The tax commission held that it
had jurisdiction, and ordered a refund by the city. Certiorari
was granted by the circuit judge, Judge Grimball, who dis-
charged the writ and affirmed the order of the tax commission.
On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court the judgment
was reversed; opinion by Mr. Justice Lewis. The court held that
the sections invoked by the taxpayers applied only to rebate or
refund of a property tax.
24
D. Documentary Stamp Tax-Form Versus Substance
Tax counsel are constantly reminded of the importance, for
tax purposes, of the form in which transactions are cast. Usually
the taxpayer is bound by the form which he adopts; the taxing
sovereign has been able, on occasion, to challenge the form and
tax the transaction according to the asserted substantive reality.2 5
Seldom is the taxpayer successful in asserting the latter argu-
ment. Textron, Inc. 'v. Livingston20 involving the question of the
applicability of the South Carolina documentary stamp tax to a
conveyance of realty on which a factory had been constructed,
was a case in which the taxpayer offered an appealing argument
for disregarding the form of his transaction. N'onetheless, the
court held that he was bound by the form in which his transac-
tion was cast.
Textron desired in 1959 to negotiate a lease for a new factory
to be constructed in South Carolina, but had not as yet made the
necessary arrangements with a charitable foundation as lessor.
Wishing to move ahead without delay, Textron executed an
agreement with Daniel Construction Company whereby the
latter would acquire a site for the factory, as trustee for Textron
or its nominee, and commence erection of the plant. On January
5, 1959 this agreement was made, and on January 14 Daniel
acquired a site of some fifty acres from one Few, taking title in
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-2681 and -2682 (1962).
24. The supreme court has held that the basic rule is reasonable in that it
provides to governmental officials information as to the collected tax moneys
upon which they may rely in preparation of the operating expenses of govern-
ment. Weathers v. City of Laurens, 187 S.C. 297, 197 S.E. 317 (1938).
25. Leading federal decisions are National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,
336 U.S. 422 (1949) and Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945).
26. 244 S.C. 380, 137 S.E.2d 267 (1964).
6
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its own name, and paying approximately 25,000 dollars for the
land. Proper documentary stamp taxes were affixed to this deed
of transfer. Under the contract with Textron, Daniel was to
build the plant, and would be paid a sum not in excess of 1,500,-
000 dollars, including the land cost. While Daniel was proceed-
ing with the construction, Textron found a desirable lessor, the
relief and annuity board of the Southern Baptist Convention
(Convention). Textron entered into an agreement with Conven-
tion. Under this agreement, Convention would, upon completion
of the plant, take title to the property and simultaneously lease
it to Textron for a long term. Textron instructed Daniel to con-
vey the completed plant to Convention, which Daniel did by
deed dated July 81, 1959. Although the record does not clearly
say, it is assumed that Convention paid the agreed consideration
therefor. Pursuant to a ruling of the tax commission, Textron
purchased under protest and affixed documentary stamp taxes in
the amount of 3,077 dollars.
Section 65-689 of the code requires that a deed, whereby realty
sold shall be transferred to the purchaser or to any other person
by his direction, shall bear a tax stamp in the amount of one dol-
lar per five dollars consideration. Textron argued that Daniel
had taken title only as trustee for Textron, and had Daniel con-
veyed the property to Textron itself, no stamp tax would be pay-
able. Further, had Textron entered the agreement with Conven-
tion at a stage whereby Convention was equitable owner of the
site during construction, no stamp tax would be payable on trans-
fer by Daniel to Convention. In neither case would the necessary
antecedent to the statute, that realty be sold, be present. The
instant events, it was argued, should be reviewed as a single
transaction whereby Convention as cestui acquired the land and
directed construction of the plant thereon. Unfortunately for
this argument, for all the record shows, Textron was equitable
owner of the property until July 31, 1959, the date of the deed,
at which time there was a sale to Convention.
The decision of Circuit Judge Price below, affirmed by the
supreme court, Mr. Justice Moss writing the opinion, appears
correct. As Dean Griswold has written, "There is no use in think-
ing great thoughts about a tax problem unless the thoughts are
firmly based on the controlling statute.12'7 The result urged by
the taxpayer, fair though it may be, seems to be beyond reach of
the statute.
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The court, in denying relief from the statute, held that liability
is "as a general rule determinable from the form and face of the
instrument in question." 28 The deed itself recited consideration
in an amount in excess of 1,500,000 dollars. It is doubtful, how-
ever, had the deed recited no consideration, or a nominal consid-
eration, that taxpayer could escape the tax by so simple an
expedient as preparing a deed which concealed the true nature
of the transaction.
E. Tax Accounting-Installment Method
In Adams v. Burts2 9 the taxpayer sued to recover additional
income taxes paid under protest for the tax years 1960, 1961, and
1962. The dispute concerned the proper method of reporting gain
from a sale of timber from taxpayer's tract of land, the sale being
completed in 1958. Payment was to be made in installments of
3,000 dollars in 1958, 12,767 dollars in 1959, and 15,750 dollars
in each of the years 1960, 1961 and 1962 (a total of 63,017 dol-
lars). Taxpayer was on a cash basis for tax purposes. In his
returns for 1958 and 1959, taxpayer elected to return this trans-
action on an installment method of accounting. "The South
Carolina Tax Commission acquiesced in and approved plaintiff's
election of the installment method of reporting the profit on the
sale of said timber. 30 For these years, taxpayer reported on all
the profit of the 1958 and 1959 installments.
Effective January 1, 1960,31 the income tax law was amended
to permit a deduction of one-half of "gains .. . arising from the
sale or exchange of capital assets, as defined in this chap-
ter .... 1132
28. Textron, Inc. v. Livingston, 244 S.C. 380, 386, 137 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1964).
29. 245 S.C. 339, 140 S.E.2d 586 (1965).
30. Stipulation and Agreement of Parties, Record, p. 8, Adams v. Burts,
245 S.C. 339, 140 S.E.2d 586 (1965). A complicating factor in the litigation
was the fact that during 1958, 1959, and 1960, there was, as later held by the
supreme court, no statutory authority for use of the installment method. See
Heyward v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 240 S.C. 347, 126 S.E.2d 15 (1962).
Mr. Justice Moss appropriately points out that this factor is "not in issue here",
because of the tax commission's stipulation. Adams v. Burts, 245 S.C. 339,
343, 140 S.E.2d 586, 588 (1965).
31. "This act shall, upon approval of the Governor, be effective with respect
to income earned on or after January 1, 1960." S.C. Acts & J. IEs. 1960, p.
1655.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-253(6) (1962). Section 65-258.1 defines capital
assets. No specific provision relates to growing timber. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954 § 631. No issue was raised as to qualifications of timber for capital asset
treatment under the amendment; presumably it clearly qualifies unless excluded
by S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-258.1(1) (1962).
[Vol. 18
8
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The circuit judge, Judge Grimball, referred the case to the
master for Richland County, Judge Lightsey, who held in favor
of the taxpayer. The essence of his decision is that the words
"income earned" in the enacting provision are equivalent to the
words "received or accrued" in tax accounting provisions of the
tax law.38  This decision was confirmed by the circuit judge on
the report of the master. On appeal, the supreme court reversed,
in an opinion by Mr. Justice Moss.
The court rejected the accounting approach adopted by the
master in favor of a legal analysis predicated on when a "com-
pleted sale" had occurred.3 4 "All events" constituting a com-
pleted sale had occurred in 1958, hence the sale was then consum-
mated for tax purposes, and the income was then "earned." The
court added, as an additional factor tending to this construction,
the view that the legislature would not intend that cash method
and accrual method taxpayers would be taxed at different rates
on identical transactions taking place in the same year.
The difficulty arises from the necessity of filing annual re-
turns, the requirement of "annualizing," in accounting parlance.
To this problem much of the labors of accountants are devoted,
and they have developed techniques and sophistication beyond
the experience of most lawyers. If in 1960 the legislature had
merely changed the rates in the tax law, then there would have
been no denial that the taxpayer must follow the accounting
method he had adopted. The accounting method alone would
then result in different taxes between taxpayers on different
accounting methods, whose transactions were otherwise identical.
The instant case came to the court concerning a deduction section
of the tax statute, rather than a simple rate change, but it would
seem that the result should be the same. In an accounting sense,
the income was "earned" in installments; when income is earned,
33. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 65-251, 65-202(11), and 65-281 (1962) provide that in-
come shall be computed in accordance with taxpayer's regular method of ac-
counting, unless such method does not clearly reflect the income.
34. The court cited Johnson v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 235 S.C. 155,
110 S.E.2d 173 (1959). That case held that a taxpayer could not defer income
where installment obligations had been received from purchasers of cars and
had been discounted by a finance company, which held a portion thereof in a
reserve account. The amount in the reserve account was held to be income to
the auto dealer in the year of the sale, although if a purchaser failed to carry
out his installment obligations, the finance company could use the reserve to
protect itself against loss. In Johnson the court followed Commissioner v.
Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959). The instant case could be distinguished from
these authorities since taxpayer here was using the installment method; tax-
payers in Hansen and Johnson were on the accrual method. The lower court
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it is based on the accounting convention that the taxpayer adopts.
In the instant case, despite the lack of authority in the law for
taxpayer's returning the income in installments, the stipulation
was made that the treatment was proper. The problem is not
easy of solution, but with due deference to the court's approach,
it would seem that the ruling of the master and the circuit judge
was sound.35
F. Tao Procedure-Standing to Sue for Recovery of Wrongfully
Collected Taxes
In Furman Univ. v. Livingston,6 the university had collected
admissions taxes37 on tickets sold at its 1960 football games, and
had paid the taxes under protest. The university then sued for
a refund. The supreme court held that only the taxpayer had
standing to sue for refund.38 In this case the court said that the
taxpayer, was the purchaser of the ticket, not the university,
which was merely a collecting agent for the state.3 9
35. It must be admitted that further support for the position of the supreme
court, though not directly in point, may be found in Schlude v. Commissioner,
372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687
(1961) ; and Automobile Club v. United States, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
36. 244 S.C. 200, 136 S.E.2d 254 (1964).
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-801 (1962) levies the admissions tax; section 65-
801(4) exempts admissions charged by eleemosynary or non-profit entities.
38, S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2686 (1962).
39. This problem of standing to sue led the University of Georgia to follow
the procedure of asking injunctive relief when it asserted that a federal ad-
missions tax on admissions to athletic contests under the auspices of the state
was unconstitutional. Allen" v. Regents of the Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439 (1938)
held that the remedy of injunctive relief was available despite the predecessor
of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 7421(a). The court then found that the tax was
constitutional as applied to the University's athletic contests. South Carolina
has a statutory provision, S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2651 (1962), similar to the cited
federal provision; no indication has been found in state decisions as to whether
an exception to withholding injunctive relief would be made where the remedy
of action for refund was inadequate.
[Vol. 18
10
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